基于博弈判断的股票期权行为激励控制策略

现代公司治理机制中,如何激励企业经理人是一个非常重要的问题,而股权激励作为一种长期激励方式,经过实践证明是非常有效的。本文以博弈论中的委托-代理理论为基础,分析了股票期权的激励机制,并找出了股票期权实施过程中存在的问题,提出了相关的控制策略,以期对国有企业改革中的激励监督机制的完善提出一定的积极性的建议。

Based on Game Theory Judgment Acts of Incentive Stock Option Control Strategy

In modem corporate governance mechanisms, how to motivate business managers is a very important question, and equity-based incentive as a long-term incentive approach has been proved through practice to be highly effective. This paper, based on the game theory of the principal - agent theory, analyzes the stock option incentive mechanisms, finds out problems existing in the implementation of stock option, and puts forward the relevant control strategy to hope that can put forward some positive suggestions to perfect the incentive supervision mechanism in the state-owned enterprise reform.