Bookbuilding with heterogeneous investors |
| |
| Institution: | 1. M.J. Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX 76129, United States;2. University of Macau, Av. Padre Tomás Pereira, Taipa, Macau;3. School of Business, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong;4. Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau, Av. Padre Tomás Pereira, Taipa, Macau;1. Bank of Finland, PO Box 160, 00101 Helsinki, Finland;2. Bank of Finland, PO Box 160, 00100 Helsinki, Finland and University of Turku, Finland |
| |
| Abstract: | Empirical evidence suggests that better-informed investors in bookbuilt IPOs submit more informative bids and receive better allocations than do investors with less precise information. While the traditional bookbuilding argument accounts for this evidence as better-informed investors being rewarded with more favorable allocations for providing more useful information, the present paper adopts the winner's curse argument and shows that better-informed investors get better allocations by being better able to pick underpriced issues, even though in equilibrium investors' bids fully reveal their information. The paper offers empirical implications that allow the two arguments to be separated. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
