Household mobility in New York City’s regulated rental housing market

This study analyzes the effect New York City’s rent regulation regime has on household mobility. Using a panel dataset from the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey, we estimate the costs and benefits to a particular household of remaining in a regulated unit each period; then in a second stage, we include the benefits of regulations (lowered rent) and the corresponding costs (from disequilibrium in consumption) as explanatory variables in two mobility models. Both logit and survival models confirm that larger benefits in one period are associated with a lower probability of moving in a second period. Similarly, larger costs (distortions in housing consumption) in one period are associated with a higher probability of moving later. While these effects are modest, they are statistically significant. The benefit and cost effects are, however, not symmetric; the pro-mobility effects of costs are roughly twice as large as the anti-mobility effects of benefits. This provides limited support for the relative loss aversion hypothesis of behavioral economics. This support is limited due to the lack of robustness of the result.