Dictatorial domains |
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Authors: | Navin Aswal Shurojit Chatterji Arunava Sen |
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Institution: | (1) PROS Revenue Management, Houston, USA , US;(2) Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, Mexico D.F. 10700, MEXICO , MX;(3) Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi 110016, INDIA (e-mail: asen@isid.ac.in) , IN |
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Abstract: | Summary. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined
on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates
that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide
an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial
and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002
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ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments.
Correspondence to: A. Sen |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Social choice functions Strategyproof Dictatorship Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem Restricted domains |
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