| 试析委托—代理关系下房地产市场政策选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘琳琳. 试析委托—代理关系下房地产市场政策选择[J]. 经济与管理, 2008, 22(11): 95-97 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘琳琳 |
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| 作者单位： | 中山大学政务学院,广东,广州,510006 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托—代理关系下,由于地方政府与中央政府在目标和利益上有时不一致,地方政府会采取能够使自身利益最大化的行动,从而使政策目标发生扭曲。＂中央—地方双向纠错机制＂意在唤醒基于公共精神的行政治理,注重公共利益。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理 房地产政策 失灵 |
Analysis of Poficy in the Domain of Real Estate Market under the Relationship of Principal-agent |
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| Liu Linlin. Analysis of Poficy in the Domain of Real Estate Market under the Relationship of Principal-agent[J]. Economy and Management, 2008, 22(11): 95-97 |
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| Authors: | Liu Linlin |
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| Affiliation: | Uiu Linlin (School of Government, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510006, China) |
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| Abstract: | Under the relationship of principal-agent between central and local governments,conflicting aims and interests will cause local governments take actions to maximize their own interest and its paradox has been emerging sometines.Central-lo-cal bidirectional rectify framework appeals to public administration based on public spirit,and helps the government paying at-tention to the public profit. |
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| Keywords: | relationship of principal-agent policy for real estate industry out of order |
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