Local interaction in tax evasion |
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| Authors: | Barnabá s M. Garay,Andrá s Simonovits,Já nos Tó th |
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| Affiliation: | a Faculty of Information Technology, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Práter utca 50/A, Budapest, H-1083, Hungaryb Computer and Automation Institute (SZTAKI), Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Kende u. 13-17, Budapest, H-1111, Hungaryc Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budaörsi út 45, Budapest, H-1112, Hungaryd Department of Economics, Central European University, Nádor u. 9., Budapest, H-1051, Hungarye Department of Differential Equations, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, M?egyetem rakpart 3-9, Budapest, H-1111, Hungaryf Department of Analysis, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, M?egyetem rakpart 3-9, Budapest, H-1111, Hungary |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
When individuals underreport their incomes, they take into account their private gains and moral losses, the latter depending on the acquaintances’ previous underreports. We prove that under quite natural assumptions the process globally converges to the symmetric steady state. |
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| Keywords: | C62 H26 |
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