Performance Payments for Groups: The Case of Carnivore Conservation in Northern Sweden |
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Authors: | Astrid Zabel Göran Bostedt Stefanie Engel |
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Institution: | 1. School of Agricultural, Forest and Food Sciences, Bern University of Applied Sciences, L?nggasse 85, 3052?, Zollikofen, Switzerland 2. CERE, Center of Environmental and Resource Economics and Department of Forest Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, SLU, 901 83, Ume?, Sweden 3. Institute for Environmental Decisions (IED), Environmental Policy and Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH, 8092?, Zurich, Switzerland
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Abstract: | This paper presents a first empirical assessment of carnivore conservation under a performance payment scheme. In Sweden, reindeer herder villages are paid based on the number of lynx (lynx lynx) and wolverine (gulo gulo) offspring certified on their pastures. The villages decide on the internal payment distribution. It is generally assumed that benefit distribution rules are exogenous. We investigate them as an endogenous decision. The data reveals that villages’ group size has a direct negative effect on conservation outcomes and an indirect positive effect which impacts conservation outcomes through the benefit distribution rule. This result revises the collective action hypothesis on purely negative effects of group size. |
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