农村公共产品有效供给的政府行为探析--基于利益博弈分析

我国农村公共产品供给不足已是不争的事实。在经济转型期市场配置不能有效保障农村公共产品有效供给的情形下，需要政府干预。通过利益博弈分析表明，当农村公共产品供给只是政府间的各部门提供时，其供给效率是低下的；当农村公共产品供给由政府和其他某一供给主体合作供给时，由于不供给是其他供给主体的占优策略，因此其他供给主体会采取不供给行为，从而加大政府供给压力；当农民和政府在农村公共产品供给中存在弱委托-代理关系时，委托人农民观察不到代理人政府的努力水平，其政府的供给效率在没有委托人的约束下变得低下。因此，农村公共产品有效供给需要政府行为加以改善。同时，健全的制度安排、完善的供给体系、有效的监管体系等配套体系能确保政府行为发挥有效作用。

The Analysis of the Government Behavior in the Supply of Rural Public Good---Based on the Interests of the Game Analysis

Insufficient supply of rural public goods in China is an indisputable fact. In the period of economic transition, market allocation can not effectively protect the effective supply of rural public goods, which needs government intervention. Through the game analysis showing that, when the government departments supply the rural public goods only, the supplying efficiency is low; when the government and some other main supplies cooperation supply the rural public goods, no supply is the dominant strategy for other supplies, the other main supplies will take no supply behavior, so that will increase govern-ment supply pressure; when the farmers and the government has weak principal-agent relationship in the supply of rural pub-lic goods, the principal can not observe the agent effective level, so that the efficiency of government supply become low without of client binding. Therefore, the effective supply of the rural public goods needs the improved government behavior. At the same time, improve the system, improve the supply system, effective supervision system and other supporting system can play a role in effectively ensuring the government behavior.