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Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, CREATE, Université Laval, Pavillon J.-A.-DeSève, 1025, av. des Sciences-Humaines, Québec, Canada G1V 0A6;2. Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA;3. Ministère des Finances et de l’Économie du Québec, Canada |
| Abstract: | We analyze a monopolist's incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time- and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally. |
| Keywords: | Economics of antibiotic resistance Antibiotic innovation Monopoly Generic industry Social optimum Economic instruments |
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