| 网络产业接入定价与垂直排斥 |
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| 引用本文： | 姜春海.网络产业接入定价与垂直排斥[J].产业经济研究,2006(6):15-22. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姜春海 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北财经大学,产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁,大连,116025 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目“网络瓶颈与接入规制:一般理论、国际比较与政策设计”(项目批准号:05JJD630031)的阶段性成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 利用简单线性函数模型,本文证明,当独立下游企业的生产效率不低于垂直一体化企业下游部门时,一体化企业确定的最优接入价格并不必然高于独立上游瓶颈设施企业确定的最优接入价格,这意味着此时不一定存在垂直排斥问题。如果垂直一体化企业下游部门比独立下游企业生产效率较高,一体化企业就具有垂直排斥独立下游企业的激励,并且效率差距越大,垂直排斥的激励程度越大,但利润最大化的一体化企业并不会完全将竞争对手驱逐出下游市场。
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| 关 键 词： | 网络产业 接入定价 垂直一体化 垂直排斥 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-9301（2006）06-0015-08 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-06-13 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年6月13日 |
Access Pricing and Vertical Foreclosure in Network Industries |
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| PIANG Chunhai.Access Pricing and Vertical Foreclosure in Network Industries[J].Industrial Economics Research,2006(6):15-22. |
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| Authors: | PIANG Chunhai |
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| Abstract: | Use a simple linear functions model,this paper show that if the efficiency of downstream rivals is not lower than the downstream branch of the vertical integrated firm,the optimal access price settled by the vertical integrated firm is not always higher than the optimal access price that would be settled by a independent upstream monopolist,this means that there will be not always vertical foreclosure.If the efficiency of the downstream branch of the vertical integrated firm is higher than downstream rivals,the vertical integrated firm will have the incentive to foreclose downstream rivals through access pricing,and the more that the difference of the efficiency,the more possible of vertical foreclosure,but in order to get maximum profit,the vertical integrated firm does not entirely drives rivals out the downstream market. |
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| Keywords: | network industries access pricing vertical integration vertical foreclosure |
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