动态联盟中防范道德风险的激励模型

本文论述了动态联盟中存在的道德风险问题,介绍了防范道德风险的Tirole模型,并通过在动态联盟中引入第三方系统,建立了一个委托—代理分析框架下的不完全信息动态博弈模型;指出盟员的收入与动态联盟利润具有动态一致性,可以通过由第三方系统(外部委托人)设计一种激励与监督并行的分配政策,来防范道德风险。最后,阐述了动态联盟运作过程中第三方系统的构成。

An Incentive Model of Preventing Moral Hazard in The Dynamic Alliance

This article discusses the moral hazards existing in the dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole model used to prevent moral hazard. By drawing the third-part system into dynamic alliance, it builds a dynamic incomplete-information game model in the frame of principal-agent theory. A conclusion is drawn that there is dynamic continuity between the partner's income and the alliance's profit. We can prevent moral hazard through designing a kind of distribution policy by the third-part system. In the end, it explains the composition of the third-part system during the operation of dynamic alliance.