The challenge of akrasia for the theory of rational choice |
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| Authors: | Gene Callahan |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Politics, Cardiff University, 38 Carroll St. 2R, Brooklyn, NY 11231, USA |
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| Abstract: | The phenomenon of akrasia, in which an actor makes a choice she regrets even while choosing it, appears problematic for theories
of rational choice, which assume that an agent prefers any chosen course of action. The apparent possibility of akratic action
presents a challenge to rational choice theorists, either to demonstrate that it is illusory or to show that akratic action
does not violate the axioms of rational choice. The problematic status of akrasia is exhibited most sharply when set against
the backdrop of praxeology. Therefore, this paper will explore whether the idea of akratic action can be reconciled with the
fundamental principles of praxeology.
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| Keywords: | Akrasia Rational choice Time preference reversal Behavioral economics |
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