Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees |
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Authors: | Joseph Price Marc Remer Daniel F. Stone |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, joe_price@byu.edu;2. Economic Analysis Group, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20036‐5128, marc.remer@usdoj.gov;3. Department of Economics Oregon State University 303 Ballard Hall Ext Corvallis, OR 97331, dan.stone@oregonstate.edu |
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Abstract: | This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association referees. Identification of basketball referee bias is typically difficult as changes in observed statistics may be caused by either changes in referee bias or player behavior. We identify bias by exploiting the fact that referees have varying degrees of discretion over different types of a particular statistic‐turnovers. This allows us to conduct a treatment and control‐style analysis, using the less discretionary turnovers as the player behavior control. The results provide evidence that referees favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase consumer demand. |
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