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产权、金融稳定政策与中央银行独立性
摘    要:


Property-rights, financial stabilization policies, and central bank independence
Authors:Shao’an Huang  Kun He
Institution:(1) Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China;(2) School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, 100081, China
Abstract:This paper builds a micro-behavior model of central bank and financial institutions from the perspective of property-rights. By analyzing the theoretical model and the practice, we conclude that, in the framework of the present financial stabilization policies in China, the central bank’s functions of monetary policy and financial stabilization are enslaved to financial institutions. Thus, central bank independence has been damaged because of the actual property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. The policy implication is to cut off the property-right relation between the central bank and the financial institutions. __________ Translated from Caijing wenti yanjiu 财经问题研究 (Research on Finanical and Economic Issues), 2007, (6): 3–9
Keywords:capital injecting  reloaning  property-rights  central bank independence
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