#br# 不对称信息环境下的金融集权与分权*——基于中央政府视角的研究

近年来地方政府在金融管理和金融风险处置上的作用日益被强调，但中央与地方政府的金融管理权责却模糊不清。本文从中央政府的视角，从信息、道德风险以及金融外部性三方面来分析金融管理的集权与分权问题。研究发现在金融集权的模式下，由于地方政府的隐性干预，一国可能会处于高度的金融抑制状态。在金融分权情境下，地方状态信息对一项金融政策制定越重要、信息甄别成本越大，中央向地方政府授权的价值越大，同时中央对地方政府的道德风险容忍度越高。而当引入金融外部性，尤其是金融风险极易跨区域传染的特性时，有着强大的行政控制力和丰富的宏观金融工具的中央政府在协调地区间金融溢出效应，控制系统性金融风险方面相比地方政府具有比较大的优势。因而，本文认为在金融分权的情境下，政策性金融权力的下放并不是一个绝对的放与不放的问题，而是一个金融适度分权问题，即合理地将一系列的政策性金融权力配置给中央与地方政府，寻求最优金融分权结构，守住不发生区域性、系统性金融风险的底线。

FINANCIAL CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION WITH IMPERFECTION INFORMATION: WHICH IS BETTER#br#

The responsibility of local government about financial regulation and bailout has been increasingly emphasized, but the authorities and responsibilities between central and local government still remains ambiguous This paper analyzes how to design the optimal financial decentralization for central government in theory, based on information, moral risk and financial externality Under financial centralized situation, a country may be in a state of high degree of financial repression, because of the hidden intervention of local government Under financial decentralization, the more important local state information is for a financial policy making and the larger screening cost is, the greater decentralization value is and the more the central government is tolerant of local governments But introducing financial externality, especially cross regional contagious characteristics of financial risks, the central government with strong administrative ability and rich macro financial instruments has a comparative advantage in coordinating regional financial spillover effects and controlling systemic financial risk, compared to the local government So, we believe that financial regime is not an absolute centralization or decentralization question, but a financial modest decentralization, for seeking the optimal structure of financial decentralization and then guarding against regional and systemic financial risk.