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Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations
Authors:Stijn Van Puyvelde  Ralf Caers  Cind Du Bois  Marc Jegers
Institution:1. Department of Applied Economics, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium, E-mail: svpuyvel@vub.ac.be;2. Human Relations Research Group, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium, E-mail: ralf.caers@kuleuven.be;3. Department of Economics, Management, and Leadership, Royal Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium, E-mail: cindy.dubois@rma.ac.be;4. Department of Applied Economics, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium, E-mail: mjegers@vub.ac.be
Abstract:By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.
Keywords:Corporate governance  agency theory  stewardship theory  nursing homes  non-profit
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