Audit firm size, public ownership, and firms' discretionary accruals management

In this study, we developed and tested three hypotheses concerning earnings management in Belgium (i.e., a continental European environment). The three hypotheses are about: (1) income smoothing, (2) Bix Six auditors, and (3) public ownership. The study is motivated by the finding by Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1] and Francis, Maydew, & Sparks [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17] that Big Six audit firms act as a constraint on both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. The finding raises questions as to the determinants of earnings management in other institutional settings such as that of Belgium. Accordingly, we study publicly available financial statements of a matched sample of publicly and privately held Belgian firms. Following Francis et al. [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17], DeFond and Subramanyam [J. Account. Econ. 25 (1998) 35], and Becker et al. [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1], we use discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. We find that Belgian companies—both private and public—engage in income smoothing and manage earnings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of prior-year earnings. The evidence is also supportive of the other two hypotheses, but only when companies have earnings that are above target and have incentives to smooth earnings downwards. The fact that our results on the impact of Big Six auditors and ownership type are different for above and below target firms in Belgium, and differ with findings on U.S. samples, can be explained by the Belgian institutional environment.