国有资产使用效率问题的分析与对策研究─—基于委托—代理理论的分析

使用委托—代理人理论提高我国国有资产的使用效率。目前国有资产使用效率中存在诸多的问题,针对这些问题,从博弈论的角度,通过“选择报酬和连续努力水平的委托—代理人模型”分析国有资产运作中的委托—代理关系,提供了一种针对企业最高层决策者—总经理—的激励机制思路;针对国有资产使用中低效率的问题,提出了一种提高国有资产使用效率的有效途径,即国家控股公司按照一定的参与约束和激励约束来设计对总经理的报酬函数,在这样的激励下,使总经理的努力目标和企业目标相一致。

The Analysis on the Efficiency of State-owned Assets Based on the Principal-agency Theory

This paper introduces the principal-agency theory that improves the efficiency of the state-owned assets.It analyzes the problems in the efficiency of stated-owned assets,based on the game theory,dicusses principal-agency relationship in operation and provides the incentive mechanism for the general manager of state-owned enterprises.The paper presents the measures of improving the efficiency of state-owned assets involving the restraint mechanism and incentive mechanism,under which there will be the identical objectives between manager and enterprise.