| 经营者持股效应的理论分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚立根.经营者持股效应的理论分析[J].中国流通经济,2004,18(9). |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚立根 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北工程学院经济管理学院,河北,邯郸,056038 |
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| 基金项目： | 河北省社会科学规划项目，河北省邯郸市社会科学基金，河北省邯郸市科技局立项项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 现代企业制度产生“两权分离”,形成委托——代理关系,产生代理问题,而经营者持股是解决代理问题的一种激励方案。本文认为,经营者持股可以满足代理人的多种需要,从而激励代理人产生有利于实现企业目标的行为;经营者持股是代理人参与企业剩余分配的有效方式,是建立激励契约的必然选择。
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| 关 键 词： | 经营者 持股效应 激励理论 理论分析 |
Theoretical Analysis on the Effects of Operator Owning Shares |
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| Yao Li-gen.Theoretical Analysis on the Effects of Operator Owning Shares[J].China Business and Market,2004,18(9). |
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| Authors: | Yao Li-gen |
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| Abstract: | Starting from the agency problem existing in modern enterprise, this paper analyses its causes, states the necessities of operator owning shares;then,executes a theoretical analysis to the incentive effect of operator owning shares based on incentive theory;third,drawing on firm theory,this paper gives a profound research on the way that operator owning shares overcome the agent opportunism behavior;Finally, gives the conclusion. |
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| Keywords: | operator owning shares incentive theory theoretical analysis |
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