Family Altruism and Incentives |
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Authors: | Roberta Gatti |
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Affiliation: | World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, USA and CEPR |
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Abstract: | This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non‐negativity constraints are not binding. |
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Keywords: | Altruism Ricardian equivalence principal–agent |
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