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产权、所有权安排与融资偏好
引用本文:操仲春,张河壮.产权、所有权安排与融资偏好[J].中央财政金融学院学报,2004(4):43-46.
作者姓名:操仲春  张河壮
作者单位:中国人民大学 北京100872 (操仲春),中国人民建设银行总行 北京(张河壮)
摘    要:成熟市场的企业,由于技术和信息不对称方面的原因,更偏好于债权融资,而不是股权融资.在中国资本市场存在严重信息不对称的情况下,我国企业仍十分偏好于股权融资.这种选择基本上是经营者基于保持控制权的自利性考虑.其根源在于国有产权主体的抽象化、由此导致的失控的所有权安排、股权投资主体控制权的丧失以及债权投资主体拥有的状态依存控制权的威慑.

关 键 词:产权  剩余索取权  状态依存控制权  融资偏好
文章编号:1000-1549(2003)08-0043-05
修稿时间:2004年1月10日

Property Rights, Arrangement of Ownership and Financing Preference
CAO Zhong-chun,ZHANG He-zhuang.Property Rights, Arrangement of Ownership and Financing Preference[J].Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics,2004(4):43-46.
Authors:CAO Zhong-chun  ZHANG He-zhuang
Institution:CAO Zhong-chun ZHANG He-zhuang
Abstract:In developed market, enterprises prefer debt financing to right financing, based on the consideration of financing cost and information asymmetry. Under the background that there is great information asymmetry in China capital market, however Chinese enterprises still prefer to right financing. This kind of preference is based on managers' selfish consideration to keep rights of control. The reason is abstract ownership of state, inefficient arrangement of ownership, loss of control rights of stock- holders, and the state-contingent control rights of creditors.
Keywords:Property rights  Residual claims  State-contingent rights of control  Financing preference
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