管理层权力与上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的实证研究——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

本文在对国内外文献进行充分回顾的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,以国有上市公司为研究样本,检验了管理层权力对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。在此基础上,本文利用回归模型对上市公司的业绩进行了分离,经验证据发现,在管理层权力的影响下,高管薪酬与上市公司非正常业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系,与此同时,高管薪酬与上市公司的正常业绩之间的相关性却明显减弱。

An Empirical Study of Management Power and Sensitiveness of Listed Company Compensation Performance ---from the Experimental Evidence of State- Owned Listed Company

Based on a review of documents home and abroad, based on the special system background of Chinese capital market, with state - owned listed companies as sample, this paper testifies the effect of management power on the sensitiveness of listed company compensation performance. On this basis, this paper separates the listed company performance with regression model. The results show that under the influence of management power, the relationship between executive compensation and abnormal performance of listed company is positive. Meanwhile, executive compensation and listed company＇s normal performance is obviously weakening.