政府角色定位与企业改制的成败

由产权不清和政府寻租导致的企业家努力水平低下是造成乡镇企业经营困难的根本原因 ,企业改制是解决这一问题的主要手段。但是 ,如果改制仅仅局限于所有权易手 ,不去触动地方政府事后寻租的权力基础 ,不形成对产权的有效保护 ,那么考虑到政府的事后寻租 ,企业家仍然不会提供高水平的努力。只有进行政府机构改革 ,使企业家确立政府不会事后寻租的信念 ,企业家的激励问题才能真正得到解决。本文通过构造一个两阶段不完全博弈信号传递模型 ,解释了造成改制后地区间经济绩效差异的原因 ,阐明了机构改革是政府传递改制决心、企业家识别政府类型的关键信号。而是否进行政府机构改革则决定了改制的成败

The Positioning of Governmental Role and the Outcome of Enterprise's Institutional Reform

Entering the 1990s, gaizhi has been adopted by the Chinese government to release government ownership of small and medium SOEs and collective firms.Previous studies show that financial problem is governments' major concern.The next question is how the newly created private ownership is protected. This paper studies how the rent seeking behavior of a local government vested with excessive and unchecked power can become a destructive factor to private ownership and damage the outcome of gaizhi. Our study has the purpose to set out a dynamic game model with imperfect information.Government reform serves as a signal to show to the entrepreneur the government's commitment to limit its power.Since a government reform is costly,this commitment is credible.Therefore,if the government conducts its own reform,the entrepreneur believes this commitment and makes higher efforts;otherwise,he makes smaller efforts.This model can be applied to explain the regional differences between firm performance after gaizhi is implemented.