The economics of hedge funds |
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Authors: | Yingcong Lan Neng Wang Jinqiang Yang |
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Affiliation: | 1. Cornerstone Research, New York, NY 10022, USA;2. Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA;3. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA;4. School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China |
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Abstract: | Hedge fund managers trade off the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation. Money flows, managerial restart options, and management ownership increase the importance of high-water-mark-based incentive fees but management fees remain the majority. Investors' valuation of fees are highly sensitive to their assessments of the manager's skill. |
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Keywords: | G11 G12 G2 G32 |
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