华尔街金融风暴与政府救市:对道德风险假说的实证检验

当前发生的华尔街金融风暴进一步加剧了次贷危机的负面效应，为此，美国及国际上对于政府参与挽救金融市场与金融机构的讨论不绝于耳。其反对者主要担心政府救市会助长了投资者的冒进心理从而引发道德风险。通过对此方面的研究综述与回顾，以及对其实证结果的分析显示，格林斯潘在1987年股市崩溃以及1998年LTCM危机后采取的救市措施与美国1990年代后期的股市泡沫并无必然联系。由于政府救市强调在市场崩溃时积极救助，挽救市场信心，因而在危机进一步加剧的情况下不失为一种可供选择的政策方案。

The Financial Storm of Wall-Street and Government Actions:An Empirical Test on the Hypothesis of Moral Hazard

The current financial storm of Wall-Street has strengthened the negative effects of the subprime mortgage crisis,resulting in a discussion on the government actions to prevent investors from losses.The opponent is worrying about moral hazard generated from these actions,because they can encourage speculations.This paper aims to discuss whether the asymmetric monetary policy,i.e.Greenspan Put,which was pursued by the Fed for a long time,can really result in the moral hazard or not.We review and summarize the relevant literature on Greenspan Put and moral hazard both theoretically and practically,and the results showed that,this policy has not absolutely led to the stock market bubbles in late 1990s.Since this policy emphasizes rescuing the market confidence,the government actions could be adopted as a selection when the crisis is worse off.