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CFO权力与企业债务违约
引用本文:何瑛,宋康宁,张宇扬.CFO权力与企业债务违约[J].财务研究,2020(2):39-53.
作者姓名:何瑛  宋康宁  张宇扬
作者单位:北京邮电大学经济管理学院
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学基金项目(19YJA630025)。
摘    要:本文从组织权力、专家权力、声誉权力、所有权权力四方面构建CFO综合权力指数,基于2008~2017年沪深A股数据,分析了CFO权力对企业债务违约概率的影响及作用机制。研究结果显示,CFO权力越大,企业债务违约概率越低,在控制内生性影响后,该结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,具有较大权力的CFO通过降低业绩波动性和缓解融资约束来抑制企业发生债务违约。本文从CFO权力视角拓展了债务违约影响因素研究,对企业完善人力资源制度安排和降低债务违约风险具有一定的借鉴价值。

关 键 词:CFO权力  债务违约  业绩波动  融资约束

CFO Power and Corporate Debt Default
HE Ying,SONG Kang-ning,ZHANG Yu-yang.CFO Power and Corporate Debt Default[J].Finance Research,2020(2):39-53.
Authors:HE Ying  SONG Kang-ning  ZHANG Yu-yang
Abstract:This study constructs a chief financial officier(CFO)power index by using four dimensions(i.e.,structural power,expert power,prestige power and ownership power).This study analyzes the influence and mechanism of CFO power on the probability of corporate debt default.Data were collected from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies for a period of 2008-2017.The results indicate that higher CFO power leads to the lower probability of corporate debt default,which still holds after controlling for endogeneity concerns.Furthermore,the results show that powerful CFOs can restrain corporate debt defaults by reducing the performance fluctuations and relaxing financial constraints.From the perspective of CFO power,the current study expands the scope of researches related to the influencing factors of corporate debt default,and provides important reference value for enterprises to improve the human resource systems,and finally reduce the risk of debt default.
Keywords:CFO power  debt default  performance fluctuation  financing constraints
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