Managerial Delegation Theory Revisited |
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| Authors: | Luciano Fanti Luca Gori Mauro Sodini |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy;2. Department of Political Science, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy |
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| Abstract: | This article challenges the results of the ‘classical’ managerial delegation literature, where it is assumed that the weight of the managerial bonus only depends on the owner's will to maximise his own profits. By considering sales (S) (resp. relative profit (RP)) contracts, the received literature has found that (S,S) (resp. (RP,RP)) is the unique pure‐strategy sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium in a game that contrasts S (resp. RP) with pure profit maximisation (PM). This article shows that none of the previous results may hold when the owner negotiates about managerial compensation with his manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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