基于绿色生产的闭环供应链决策及认证标准研究

在考虑绿色生产的基础上，以单一制造商、零售商和回收商组成的闭环供应链为研究对象，构建以制造商为主导的无认证集中决策、分散决策和有认证集中决策Stackelberg博弈模型，研究不同模型下的供应链决策和政府绿色认证标准，并用算例仿真对比分析消费者绿色偏好和企业信誉对各决策的影响。结果表明：在不进行绿色认证的情况下，集中决策闭环供应链利润和污染物减排量大于分散决策；政府总能够制定合理的绿色认证标准，使制造商自愿认证的同时，提高供应链收益和减少碳排放；不同模型下的最优决策均会随着消费者绿色偏好的增加而提高，无认证模型下还会随着企业信誉的增加而提高。

Research on the Closed-loop Supply Chain Decision-making and Certification Standards Based on Green Production

Based on the consideration of green production, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer, a retailer and a recycler is taken as the research object to construct Stackelberg game model including a manufacturer-led centralized decision making without certification, a decentralized decision making and a centralized decision making with certification.The impact of consumer green preferences and corporate reputation on each decision is compared and analyzed by simulation. The results show that without green certification, the profit and pollutant reduction of closed-loop supply chain are greater than those of decentralized decision; the government is always able to set reasonable green certification standards, so that manufacturers can voluntarily certify while improving supply chain profit and reducing carbon emission; the optimal decision under different models increases with the increase of consumers'' green preference, and increases with the increase of enterprise reputation under the model without certification. The optimal decision under different models increases with the increase of consumer''s green preference, and with the increase of company''s reputation under the no-certification model.