Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis |
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Authors: | Simran K. Kahai David L. Kaserman |
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Affiliation: | (1) Boler School of Business, John Carroll University, 20700 North Park Blvd., University Heights, OH 44118, USA;(2) College of Business, Auburn University, 415 W. Magnolia Ave., Auburn, AL 36849, USA |
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Abstract: | Regulatory decisions often must be made in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and arguments presented by the affected parties frequently add to, rather than resolve, that uncertainty. Here, we examine several of the deregulatory decisions affecting the long-distance market that were rendered by the FCC over the two-decade period following the divestiture of AT&T. Our purpose is to provide empirical evidence relevant to some of the arguments regarding market conditions that were presented during that period. Findings suggest that some of the more prominent allegations are not supported by the data. |
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Keywords: | Deregulation Long-distance telecommunications Tacit collusion |
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