Asymmetric group loans,non-assortative matching and adverse selection |
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| Authors: | Shubhashis Gangopadhyay Robert Lensink |
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| Affiliation: | 1. India Development Foundation, India;2. Shiv Nadar University, India;3. University of Gothenburg, Sweden;4. Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, The Netherlands;5. Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts. |
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| Keywords: | D8 G2 O1 |
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