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Rational Inefficiencies
Authors:Bogetoft  Peter  Hougaard  Jens Leth
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, Royal Agricultural University, Rolighedsvej 23, 1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark;(2) Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract:In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.
Keywords:efficiency  preferences  incentives  bargaining  planning
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