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中小企业应收账款质押融资模式中的道德风险研究
引用本文:陈欢. 中小企业应收账款质押融资模式中的道德风险研究[J]. 江苏商论, 2014, 0(11): 53-55
作者姓名:陈欢
作者单位:浙江工商大学金融学院,浙江杭州310008
摘    要:
应收账款质押融资作为供应链金融较常见的融资模式,是解决中小企业融资难的有效途径。该模式的风险因素包括信用风险、道德风险、法律风险和行业风险。其中道德风险主要由银企之间信息不对称引起。博弈论分析表明,道德风险受核心企业的监督意愿、银行和核心企业的监督成本以及对违约企业的惩罚力度的影响。

关 键 词:中小企业  供应链金融  应收账款质押融资  道德风险  博弈

Moral Hazard in SMEs Hedge of Accounts Receivable Financing Model
Abstract:
Pledge of accounts receivable financing as an important method of supply chain finance, is an ef- fective way to solve the financing difficulties of SMEs. The system risk factors of this model include credit risk, moral hazard, legal risk and industry risk and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between banks and enterprises. Game theory analysis showed that moral hazard in the pledge of accounts receivable financing affect- ed by the willingness to supervision of the core enterprise, the supervision cost and the punishment to the default enterprises by banks and the core enterprise.
Keywords:Small and medium-sized enterprises  supply chain finance  pledge of accounts receivable financ-ing  moral hazard  Game
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