Competition Policy towards Vertical Restraints in Europe and the United States |
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Authors: | William S. Comanor Patrick Rey |
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Affiliation: | (1) University of California, Los Angeles and Santa Barbara, U.S.A;(2) University of Social Sciences, Toulouse, France;(3) CEPR, London, U.K.;(4) CREST, Paris, France |
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Abstract: | Following a brief review of the economic analysis of vertical restraints, we discuss current policy standards in both Europe and the United States. Since 1981, U.S. policy towards these restraints has been lax, and no restraints were challenged during the 12-year period between January 1981 and January 1993. More recently, the pendulum has shifted back somewhat and there is renewed interest by enforcement officials in this area. In contrast, European policy standards have been more stringent, and have paid particular attention to vertically imposed restraints that can limit trade among member countries. To a large part, their different treatment may primarily reflect the lack of consensus as to their long-run economic consequences. Consistent policy standards across jurisdictions are not likely to arise until there is general consensus as to the economic implications of these restraints. |
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Keywords: | Vertical restraints competition policy international policy differences |
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