Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games |
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Authors: | Alejandro M Manelli |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, 85287-3806 |
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Abstract: | It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8. |
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Keywords: | existence subgame perfect equilibrium infinite stage games cheap talk correlation |
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