Multi-market interaction and decentralization of R&D decisions |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Business Management, Tatung University, 40, Sec. 3, Zhongshan N. Rd. Zhongshan District, Taipei City 10452, Taiwan;2. Department of Economics, National Central University, No. 300, Jhongda Road, Jhongli City, Taoyuan County 32001, Taiwan;1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, School of Engineering, Makerere University, Technology Road, P.O. Box 7062, Kampala, Uganda;2. Department of Transport & Planning, Faculty of Civil Engineering and Geosciences, Delft University of Technology, Stevinweg 1, 2628 CN Delft, Netherlands;3. Department of Transport Science, School of Architecture and the Built Environment, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 72, 1tr, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden;4. Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, United States;1. Department of Civil Engineering, Montana State University, United States;2. Montana State University, United States;3. Department of Civil and Coastal Engineering, University of Florida, United States;4. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Aalto University, Finland;5. Kittelson & Associates, Inc., United States;1. Telecom ParisTech, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, and CREST-LEI, Paris, France;2. Direzione Analisi dei mercati, concorrenza e studi, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Centro Direzionale, Isola B5, 80143 Napoli, Italy;3. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali “M. Fanno”, Università di Padova, Padova, Italy |
| |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyse under what conditions it is profitable for a multi-divisional firm to encourage divisions to perform independent R&D, and when it is better to centralize R&D so that the level be chosen co-operatively. Under Bertrand competition, firms always centralize R&D decisions. Under Cournot competition, however, with divisions of the same firm producing substitute products, the strategic advantage of decentralizing R&D compensates the co-ordination loss when the degree of substitutability among the products is not too high; in all other cases (when products are very good substitutes or when divisions of the same firm produce complement goods) the pay-off to co-ordination is greater than the strategic advantage of decentralization. Social welfare is maximized when firms centralize R&D. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
