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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
Authors:Bingyong Zheng  
Institution:aSchool of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai, China 200433
Abstract:This paper presents repeated games with hidden moves, in which players receive imperfect private signals and are able to communicate. We propose a conditional probability approach to solve the learning problem in repeated games with correlated private signals and delayed communication. We then apply this approach to symmetric n-player games to obtain an approximate efficiency result.
Keywords:Repeated games  Delayed communication  Private monitoring  Effective independence
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