The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games |
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| Authors: | Stephan Kroll Todd L. Cherry Jason F. Shogren |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Department of Economics,California State University, Sacramento,Sacramento,USA;2.Center for Experimental Economics,University of Innsbruck,Innsbruck,Austria;3.Department of Economics,University of Tennessee,Knoxville,USA;4.Department of Economics and Finance,University of Wyoming,Laramie,USA |
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| Abstract: | Economists and psychologists have long argued the origin of wealth influences individual behavior. In a previous study (Cherry et al., 2005), we found the origin of endowment did not significantly affect behavior in linear public good games with summation contribution technology. In such games, however, both Nash behavior (everybody gives nothing) and social optimal behavior (everybody gives the entire endowment) call for symmetric levels of contributions. Results from this new study indicate that the origin of wealth might matter in more asymmetric situations, such as in a best-shot public good game with heterogeneous groups. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C72, C92, H41 |
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| Keywords: | Endowment heterogeneity Endowment origin Best-shot public good experiment |
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