Effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers

Management incentive schemes leading to welfare optimal pricing and efficient production of public enterprises have so far been mainly concerned with the information advantages that public enterprise managers hold over their supervising government or central planning agency. Managers under these schemes are induced to improve their firm's performance in adjustment processes which in the limit lead to optimal firm decisions. Such managers are supposed to be income maximizers disregarding any personal effort which could influence their performance and utility. In this paper I show that two incentive schemes recently proposed by Tam (1981) and Finsinger and Vogelsang (1982) can also help to induce managers to provide an optimal level of effort. Here effort is assumed to reduce managers' utility and the firm's costs. The result depends crucially on myopic managerial utility maximization. Once managers maximize the discounted value of future utility levels they will deviate from the optimal behavior. Under Tam's scheme, this can hold independent of the optimal effort level. Under the Finsinger-Vogelsang performance index managers will always show suboptimal effort levels in a steady state equilibrium, because the index only rewards welfare improvements.Effort, however, has to be rewarded even with no improvement in behavior. An improved performance index, which provides cumulative rewards is shown to be strategy proof and lead to a welfare optimum. This reward structure basically treats managers as if they were private entrepreneurs. It looks extremely generous in that it gives managers the fruits of all costs reductions due to increases in effort. Suggestions are made to mitigate this income distributional impact.