Mergers,acquisitions and control of telecommunications firms in Europe |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Medicine, Division of Hematology-Oncology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI;2. National Cancer Institute Center for Global Health , Bethesda, MD;3. Division Hematology Oncology, University of Vermont Cancer Center, VT;4. Division of Hematology and Oncology, Center for Personalized Therapy and Clinical Trials Office UC San Diego–Moores Cancer Center, San Diego, CA;1. World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington D.C., 20433, USA;2. Universidad de La Sabana, Km 7 Autopista Norte, Bogotá, Colombia;1. IndexIQ, 800 Westchester Avenue, Suite N-611, Rye Brook, NY, 10573, United States;2. University of San Francisco, School of Management, 101 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105, United States |
| |
| Abstract: | New evidence is presented about 12 large acquisitions by telecommunications firms in Europe. The average effect on acquirers’ shareholder value is not significantly different from zero, which confirms a paradox found by previous studies: bidding firms’ shareholders do not benefit from takeovers. There is high dispersion in the results. This suggests that detailed studies may uncover important aspects of the constraints that exist in the corporate control market of telecommunications firms. A case study of the Spanish firm Telefonica suggests that corporate governance problems and political intervention are significant components of these “agency” constraints. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
