Empfehlungen für das Auktionsdesign für Emissionsberechtigungen |
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Authors: | Axel Ockenfels |
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Institution: | 1.Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar,Universit?t zu K?ln,K?ln,Germany |
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Abstract: | From an economic perspective, auctions are an appropriate mechanism for the initial allocation of emissions allowances, because they tend to be advantageous with respect to distributional and efficiency goals. Different auction designs can lead to different outcomes, though, and so the choice of the auction rules is a critical challenge. Recent developments in auction theory and rich experiences with practical auction design in the energy and many other sectors can help avoiding mistakes and designing an appropriate auction mechanism. This study summarizes the relevant research and concludes with concrete recommendations for the auction design for CO2 allowances. In particular, it analyzes how the strategic options of buyers and sellers depend on the auction rules, and explains how secondary markets for allowances interact with bidding strategies and optimal institutional design. |
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