The influence of desire for control on monitoring decisions and performance outcomes in strategic alliances |
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| Institution: | 1. HAN University of Applied Sciences, P.O. Box 5171, 6802 ED Arnhem, The Netherlands;2. Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands;3. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands;1. Akershus University Hospital, Sykehusveien 25, 1478 Lørenskog, Norway;2. BI Norwegian Business School, Nydalsveien 37, 0484 Oslo, Norway;3. Loccioni Group, Via Fiume, 16, 60030 Angeli di Rosora, Ancona, Italy;4. Uppsala University, Box 534, S-75121 Uppsala, Sweden;5. Università Politecnica delle Marche, P. le. Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona, Italy;6. Università della Svizzera italiana, USI, via G. Buffi 13, 6904 Lugano, Switzerland;1. Department of Management & Marketing, College of Business, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58108-6050, United States;2. Information Systems and Operations Management Department, Sawyer School of Management, Suffolk University, 8 Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108, United States |
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| Abstract: | Strategic alliances are fraught with risks, such as the uncontrolled disclosure of core knowledge via opportunistic learning. The usefulness of monitoring in policing opportunism notwithstanding, a contrasting view is that monitoring mechanisms can themselves manifest the dark side of strategic alliances. The present study argues that a novel dark personality trait—the focal firm's desire for control—may influence key decisions pertaining to how to monitor strategic alliances, which in turn can negatively impact performance outcomes. Our conceptual model was developed and tested, based on a survey of 404 strategic alliances. The results demonstrate that a focal firm's desire for control is positively associated with process monitoring as well as output monitoring. The firm's use of process monitoring to oversee the counterpart drives its performance outcomes only if there is a low level of information exchange between the alliance partners; as such, information exchange norms substitute for process monitoring. By contrast, the focal firm's use of outcome monitoring is negatively linked to performance unless complemented by a high level of information exchange. Key implications for alliance management and future research are derived from the findings. |
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