排污权交易情境下基于微分博弈的环境服务供应链决策

本文研究由排污企业与提供治污服务的第三方企业组成的一对一环境服务供应链,基于排污权交易,分别构建排污企业与第三方的分散与集中决策微分博弈模型,以探讨供应链最优决策及协调机制设计。研究表明:较高的消费者环保意识与较低的治污项目运营成本系数均有利于供应链成员治污形成合力;当排污权价格超过一定阈值时,排污企业委托治污的经济效益可以抵消排污权价格作用下生产削减造成的损失,此衍生的红利驱使排污企业转向积极治污;排污企业与第三方任一方污染损害系数的增大都会使对方受益,而自身利润受损,仅当第三方污染损害系数增大时,排污企业出现“搭便车”行为;激励与收益分配机制协调了供应链,企业各方利润及污染控制效果均实现帕累托改善。

Decision of Environment Governance Supply Chain Based on Differential Game and Emission Trading

This paper studies the one-to-one environmental service supply chain composed of pollutant discharge enterprises and the third-party enterprises providing pollution control services.Based on the trading of pollutant discharge rights,the decen?tralized and centralized decision-making differential game models of pollutant discharge enterprises and the third party are construc?ted respectively to discuss the optimal decision-making and coordination mechanism design of the supply chain.The results show that higher consumer awareness of environmental protection and lower operating cost coefficient of pollution control projects are con?ducive to the formation of resultant force of pollution control by supply chain members.When the price of emission right exceeds a certain threshold,the economic benefits of entrusting pollution control can offset the losses caused by production reduction under the effect of emission right price,and the derived bonus drives the enterprises to actively control pollution.The increase of pollution damage coefficient of either pollutant discharging enterprise or the third party will benefit the other party,while its own profit will be damaged.Only when the pollution damage coefficient of the third-party increases,the pollutant discharging enterprise will appear“free rider”behavior.The incentive income distribution mechanism has coordinated the supply chain,and the profit of all enterpri?ses and pollution control effect gain Pareto improvements.