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董事会资本、高管薪酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据
引用本文:李小青,王梦洁,王玉坤.董事会资本、高管薪酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].工业技术经济,2016,35(8):154-160.
作者姓名:李小青  王梦洁  王玉坤
作者单位:1 燕山大学,秦皇岛 066004
2 中国地质大学(武汉),武汉 430074
摘    要:董事会资本、高管激励契约与研发投入之间的关系一直是国内外学者研究的热点和焦点问题。论文基于资源依赖理论和委托代理理论的双重视角,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用两阶段最小二乘法,考察了董事会资本对研发投入的影响,以及高管薪酬激励对二者关系的调节作用。实证研究结果显示:(1)董事会资本宽度对企业的研发投入具有显著的正向影响;(2)董事会资本深度对企业的R&D投入具有显著的正向影响;(3)进一步分析发现,高管薪酬激励对董事会资本和研发投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用。

关 键 词:董事会资本  高管薪酬激励  研发投入  资源依赖  委托代理理论  

Board Capital,Executive Compensation Incentive and R & D Input
Li Xiaoqing,Wang Mengjie,Wang Yukun.Board Capital,Executive Compensation Incentive and R & D Input[J].Industrial Technology & Economy,2016,35(8):154-160.
Authors:Li Xiaoqing  Wang Mengjie  Wang Yukun
Institution:1 Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China
2 China University of Geosciences,Wuhan 430074,China
Abstract:The relationship between board capital , executive incentive contract and R&D has always been the hot spots and focus at home and abroad . Based on the double perspective of resource dependence theory and principal -agent theory , using two -stage least squares method , this paper adopts data of GEM Listed Companies’ during the period of 2010-2013 to explore the influence of board capital on R&D input , and the moderating action to the relationship of executive compensation incentive . Empirical research indicates that :(1 ) the board capital breath has significant positive effect on R&D input ;(2 ) the board capital depth has significant positive effect on R&D in-put; (3) furthermore , the executive compensation incentive has positive moderating effect to the relationship between board capital and R&D input .
Keywords:board capital  executive compensation incentive  R&D input  resource dependence theory  principal-agent theory
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