政府与中央银行之间委托代理关系的实证检验

政府与中央银行之间存在着典型的委托代理关系,政府作为委托人,将专业化的货币操控权委托给中央银行,通过中央银行对这一权力的运用来实现对宏观经济的调控。在我国中央银行的独立性不高,这种委托代理关系显现得更加明显。政府与中央银行之间的利益博弈不清晰,就会导致中央银行对外发送的政策信息缺乏代表性,使微观主体无法辨别声音来源,进而影响中央银行的声誉和货币政策有效性。本文旨在构建委托代理模型来详细分析这种关系,并给出相应政策建议。

A Research on the Principal-agent Relationship between Government and Central Bank

There has a kind of typical principal-agent relationship between government and central bank.As principal,Government entrusts the professional control of money to central bank,so as to regulation and control the macroeconomic.In China,central bank independence is not high,so this principal-agent relationship appears more evident.The interests of the game between government and the central bank is not clear,so the information of central bank will be a lack of representation,so that the corporations and people can not distinguish the principal voice came from the top,thereby affecting the central bank＇s reputation and effectiveness on monetary policy.This article aims to build the principal-agent model to analyze this relationship and give the corresponding policy recommendations.