| 单一市场结构下横向联盟的市场绩效与规制 |
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| 引用本文： | 任剑新.单一市场结构下横向联盟的市场绩效与规制[J].中国工业经济,2004(2):42-47. |
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| 作者姓名： | 任剑新 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南财经政法大学现代产业经济研究中心,湖北,武汉,430064 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目“企业基于关系竞争力的理论与实证研究”(批准号 70 3 72 0 60 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文构造了一个单一市场结构下，双寡头古诺厂商以双边协议形式建立成本节省型横向联盟的理论模型，分析了其市场绩效和规制。结论表明：在无规制条件下，伙伴厂商存在相互收取资源使用费的激励，联盟也可能存在限制竞争危害。因此，政府应该规制联盟厂商相互收取的资源使用费不得高于节省的边际成本。
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| 关 键 词： | 单一市场结构 横向联盟 市场绩效 企业间合作行为 战略联盟 “双寡头直接竞争” 横向合并 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-480X(2004)02-0042-06 |
Market Performance and Regulation of Horizontal Alliance in Single-market |
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| REN Jian,xin.Market Performance and Regulation of Horizontal Alliance in Single-market[J].China Industrial Economy,2004(2):42-47. |
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| Authors: | REN Jian xin |
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| Abstract: | This paper constructs a theoretical model to analyze the conduct, performance and regulation of horizontal alliance, which is built up in the form of cost saving bilateral agreement between Cournot duopolistic firms in single market. The conclusion shows that both of the partner firms have the incentives to charge for exchanging resource under the circumstance of non regulation, furthermore, the alliance has probably anticompetitive effects, as a result, government should regulate the alliance charging fees no more than marginal cost saving. |
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| Keywords: | horizontal alliance anticompetitive effects regulation |
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