| 改制模式、资金占用与公司绩效 |
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| 引用本文： | 邓建平,曾勇,何佳.改制模式、资金占用与公司绩效[J].中国工业经济,2007(1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 邓建平 曾勇 何佳 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学管理学院 四川成都610054(邓建平，曾勇)，香港中文大学财务学系 香港(何佳) |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目(教技司[2005]2号)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文考察了不同改制模式对于发行上市后控股股东集团净占用上市公司资金的影响。通过分析1997—2000年我国285家国有企业首次公开发行后3年的数据,我们发现与完整改造公司相比,非完整改造公司的控股股东集团更容易发生净占用上市公司资金的问题,而且净占用的程度更高。实证研究还发现非完整改造公司的经营绩效差于完整改造公司,并且很大程度上,这种差别是来源于非完整改造公司的控股股东集团对上市公司资金的过度占用。
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| 关 键 词： | 改制模式 资金占用 股权结构 |
Reorganization Mode, Fund Embezzlement and Enterprise Performance |
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| DENG Jian-ping,ZENG Yong,HE Jia.Reorganization Mode, Fund Embezzlement and Enterprise Performance[J].China Industrial Economy,2007(1). |
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| Authors: | DENG Jian-ping ZENG Yong HE Jia |
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| Institution: | DENG Jian-ping1,ZENG Yong1,HE Jia2 |
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| Abstract: | This paper observes how different reorganization modes affect controlling shareholder's embezzlement of listed company's fund after their post-IPO. Using a sample of 285 SOEs that went public over period 1997-2000, we find that SOEs that went public through incomplete reorganization have a higher probability and degree of controlling shareholders' fund embezzlement problem than those SOEs that went through more complete reorganizations. Empirical studies also find that SOEs that went through an incomplete reorganization have significantly worse performance than those that went through more complete reorganization, and to a greater degree, this problem is due to the controlling shareholders' over-embezzlement of funds. |
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| Keywords: | reorganization mode fund embezzlement ownership structure |
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