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电网建设项目内部主体利益博弈与激励机制分析
引用本文:贺廷建.电网建设项目内部主体利益博弈与激励机制分析[J].科技和产业,2012(10):102-107.
作者姓名:贺廷建
作者单位:重庆市电力公司璧山供电局
摘    要:通过博弈混合策略纳什均衡求解,对电网公司与承包商或监理单位之间的利益博弈关系进行了分析,解释了不确定环境下的多元利益相关者的合作博弈模型的可操作性;针对电网建设项目存在的信息不对称,同时借鉴委托代理理论的激励约束机制基本分析框架,建立了信息不对称条件下的最优激励与监控约束模型,并探讨分析了激励机制与监控约束机制在电网建设项目委托代理关系中的作用。

关 键 词:电网建设项目  利益博弈  激励约束

Interest Game and Incentive Mechanism Analysis of Internal Subjects in Power Grid Construction
HE Ting-jian.Interest Game and Incentive Mechanism Analysis of Internal Subjects in Power Grid Construction[J].SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL,2012(10):102-107.
Authors:HE Ting-jian
Institution:HE Ting-jian(Bishan Power Supply Bureau of Chongqing Electric Power Corporation,Chongqing 402760,China)
Abstract:Based on solving game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,the interest game relationship between the power grid company and contractor or supervision unit is analyzed,and the operability of cooperative game model of multi-stakeholder in the uncertain environment is explained.According to existing of information asymmetry and basic analytical framework of incentive and restraint mechanism with the principal-agent theory,the optimal incentive and monitoring constraint model considering asymmetric information is established,and the effect of incentive and monitoring constraint mechanism in principal-agent relationship of power grid construction is explored.
Keywords:power grid construction  interest game  incentive and restraint
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