经理人市场对高管薪酬的影响—来自高管跳槽现象的证据

基于2007－2014年A股上市公司数据，从高管跳槽现象的视角，对经理人市场如何影响高管薪酬进行探究。研究发现，公司在发生高管跳槽之后会显著提高现任高管的薪酬，尤其是基于股权的薪酬。现任高管的薪酬提升幅度与其在经理人市场上的流动性有关，也与跳槽高管的特征（对原公司的重要性、新工作的吸引力）有关。同时，通过引入倾向得分匹配（ PSM）模型，发现发生高管跳槽的公司在事前有显著的薪酬劣势，而事后的加薪使这些公司显著的薪酬劣势消失。另外，加薪措施能够有效地防止现任高管的跳槽。研究结果说明，经理人市场中的高管跳槽行为是公司薪酬政策的重要决定因素之一。

Effects of Managerial Labor Market on Executive Compensation:Evi-dence From Executive Job-hopping

Based on the data of A-share companies in the period of 2007 to 2014, this paper shed light on how the managerial labor market influences executive compensation from the perspective of executive job-hopping.We find that companies dramatical y raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especial y equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms.The magnitude of pay raise is not only related to incumbent executives’mobility in managerial labor market but also to job-hoppers’characteristics.Using PSM model, we find that a company’s subsequent pay raise to incumbent executives after losing an executive diminishes its deficiency in executive compensa-tion relative to its peer firms, and is effective at retaining its incumbent executives.Overal , our evidence suggests that executive job-hopping activity in managerial labor market has significant effect on firms’compensation policies.