多元利益驱动下地方政府对企业信贷的干预机制研究

地方政府干预企业信贷体现了多元利益驱动下地方政府对金融资源的竞争。本文首次同时结合财政激励、晋升激励以及腐败考察了政府利益对企业信贷规模、成本以及期限结构的影响。研究表明，政府利益会对企业贷款特征产生u型影响，其中财政激励对企业贷款特征的影响范围和程度最大，晋升激励和腐败的影响范围和程度相对较弱。进一步检验发现，政府利益给予国有控股企业的信贷优势表现在：财政激励会降低贷款利率和延长贷款期限，晋升激励会设定隐含的贷款利率上限，官员腐败程度的加深会引致贷款规模、贷款利率以及贷款期限先于非国企达到最值。基于金融危机的外生冲击分析表明，危机后地方政府较少因晋升激励和腐败干预企业信贷决策。

The Local Governments Driven by Multiple Interests Dynamically Intervene in Enterprise Loans

The local government intervening in enterprise loans reflects local governments scrambling for financial resources. The paper firstly explores the effects of fiscal incentives, promotion incentives and corruption on enterprises＇ credit scales, credit cost and term structure of credit. We find that, three types of the government interests have U - shape effects on enterprise loans, fiscal incentives producing the greatest effect on enterprise loans, both promotion incentives and corruption having less greater effects on enterprise loans. In the subgroups, the government interests providing state -owned enterprises with many financial benefits： fiscal incentives could decrease lending rates and extend loan terms; promotion incentives could set an implicit upper bound of lending rates; official corruption could impel credit scales, lending rates and loan terms to get the maxima and minima. Based on the exogenous shock of the global financial crisis, local governments driven by promotion incentives and corruption are less likely to intervene in enterprise loans.