F-字典偏好与稳定匹配

研究有同事效应的双方匹配博弈的稳定性。利用拒绝-接受算法证明了,当工人具有F-字典偏好而企业具有替代性偏好时,稳定匹配一定存在。同时,给出了F-对应偏好的定义,得出在F-对应偏好下,企业一方存在一个最优稳定匹配,工人一方存在一个稳定匹配将每一个工人与他最偏好的企业匹配。

F-lexicographic Preferences and Stable Matching

This paper investigates the stability of a many-to-one matching game with F-lexicographic preference and proves that stable matching always exists when workers have F-lexicographic preferences and firms have substitutable preferences by deferred-acceptance algorithm.Under F-corresponding preference we prove that there is a firm-optimal stable matching and a stable matching that assigns each worker to his or her most preferred firm.